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 Problems and Recommendations 
From War to Illicit Economies: 
Organized Crime and State-building  
in Liberia and Sierra Leone 
Liberia and Sierra Leone are commonly categorized 
as fragile and conflict-affected states. They are seen as 
being particularly vulnerable to organized crime due 
to an insufficient management of borders, weak regu-
lation, and ineffective law enforcement. But they also 
have emerged from peace processes combining state-
building with the transformation of war economies. 
These were based on the competing control of natural 
resources such as diamonds, gold, and timber by armed 
groups and state agents. Illicit economies in the two 
countries today are largely the product of the legacy 
of these war economies and shifts in global illegal 
flows that led to West Africa becoming a transit zone 
for South American cocaine destined for Europe. 
Although the organization of crime differs for these 
sectors, the way it is tied to state-building and affili-
ated with power structures is quite similar. 
On a global scale, Liberia and Sierra Leone are 
hardly core nodes of the shadow economy, just as they 
hold a marginal position in the legal economy. But 
from a regional and country perspective, their illicit 
economies are highly relevant. Moreover, the trade in 
natural resources and drugs has important repercus-
sions beyond West Africa. But efforts to better control 
related activities in the post-war periods in Liberia and 
Sierra Leone have only been partially successful. In fact, 
the persistence of illicit economies is an expression of 
the difficult balancing act of including criminal actors 
into the post-war setting to secure stability while also 
pursuing credible reforms in the state apparatus. In 
both countries, state authority might have formally 
been reestablished, but hybrid forms of governance 
persist. Although violent actors facilitated illicit busi-
ness during the civil wars, organized criminal actors 
today rely on patronage networks that are part of the 
state-building project. Usually a lack of capacities is 
seen as the core challenge of fragile states in tackling 
organized crime. These deficiencies are real in Liberia 
and Sierra Leone, but they are not necessarily the ex-
pression of an absent state or “ungoverned spaces.” 
Rather state actors are frequently involved in organ-
ized criminal activities, mostly as “protection rack-
eteers.” 
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Problems and Recommendations 
Simply increasing the level of state coercion in this 
context is risky. As the organization of criminal actors 
is still very fragmented in Liberia and Sierra Leone, the 
danger is to erase the less coherent, smaller groups 
and trigger the reorganization of stronger networks. 
There also might be violent reactions if lower-level 
criminal activities such as illicit mining are inhibited, 
as these are an important source of income for mar-
ginalized groups, including many former combatants. 
Different international actors such as the United 
Nations (UN) and European Union (EU) as well as bi-
lateral cooperation programs have focused on curbing 
the trafficking in hard drugs through West Africa. As 
the UN Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone was closed 
in March 2014 and the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) 
is gradually withdrawing, there is the fear of a gap in 
the security architecture. Therefore, the establishment 
of functioning local institutions has become a major 
concern. In both countries, Transnational Crime Units 
(TCUs) have been set up by the West Africa Coast Ini-
tiative. However, various opportunities remain for 
committing and facilitating organized crime due to 
conflicts of competence between various existing 
agencies, the vulnerability of the political process – 
including the intransparent funding of political par-
ties and election campaigns – as well as the general 
deficiencies of the criminal justice systems, which still 
make it easy to “buy justice.” 
So far, serious instability, such as in transit zones 
of Latin America, has not occurred in Liberia and 
Sierra Leone. The incomplete state-building process 
might have given some criminal actors a relatively 
easy environment for operations. But the political 
uncertainty of post-war transitions and the strong 
international presence might also have prevented a 
more significant entry of foreign networks, particular-
ly in cocaine trafficking. However, there are potential 
sources of violence, among others a political process 
that is increasingly reliant on criminal assets and a 
possible connection of criminal networks with armed 
groups. Therefore, it is important to apply selective 
law enforcement measures combined with broader 
governance reforms and development-related initia-
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 Introduction: Conflict, Organized Crime, and State-building 
 
Organized crime in fragile and conflict-affected states 
is increasingly seen as a threat for security and devel-
opment alike. The Human Security Report 2011 refers 
to organized crime as an external stress factor pen-
etrating already vulnerable states and contributing 
to repeated cycles of violence.1 Previously, crime got 
more attention as a factor that prolonged ongoing 
civil wars by fuelling war economies. From this per-
spective, threats emanate from criminal networks 
undermining peacebuilding due to incentives for 
continuing shadowy business. In many post-conflict 
countries, both dynamics are at play, as peace pro-
cesses involve efforts to (re)build states that are char-
acterized by weak authority, capacity, and legitimacy 
as well as to transform war economies.2 
These parallel processes have also taken place in 
Liberia and Sierra Leone since the end of their civil 
wars.3 The two neighboring countries not only experi-
enced severe armed conflict and extensive war econ-
omies, but their conflicts were also strongly linked. 
Finally, the international engagement to keep peace 
based on two large UN missions involved far-reaching 
efforts of state-building in both cases. A core focus of 
these activities was strengthening the rule of law and 
reforming the security sector. However, the common 
assessment is that Liberia and Sierra Leone remain 
fragile states.4 Aspects of fragility such as insufficient 
management of borders, weak regulation, and in-
effective law enforcement are seen as invitations to 
1  World Bank, Human Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security, and 
Development (Washington, D.C., 2011). 
2  See for example Michael Pugh and Neil Cooper with Jonathan 
Goodhand, War Economies in a Regional Context: Challenges of Trans-
formation (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2004). 
3  The paper is based on field research in Liberia from November 
10 to December 9, 2013, and in Sierra Leone from January 11 to 
February 9, 2014. Interviews conducted during these trips are ano-
nymized and cited by codes indicating the country (LIB = Liberia; 
SL = Sierra Leone), the sequence number of the interview, and 
the date of the interview. I would like to thank all respondents 
for taking the time to talk to me and providing essential infor-
mation for this paper. 
4  Despite many similarities, there are naturally differences be-
tween the two countries, which will be mentioned where relevant 
for the focus of the study. Overall, however, the way organized 
crime and illicit economies have evolved and become entangled 
with the state(building) are quite similar in both countries. 
organized criminal networks. But how exactly does 
organized crime occur in these contexts? 
Clearly, Liberia and Sierra Leone show quite a few 
similarities to other fragile states. Furthermore, fac-
tors such as their locations at the coastline can also 
be pull factors for certain illicit activities. Within the 
West African region, however, neither country is a par-
ticular hot spot for organized crime. Attention tends 
to be focused on rather extreme cases linked to the 
international drug trade, such as the so called narco-
state Guinea-Bissau or Mali, where cocaine trafficking 
is usually seen as one important factor in the destabili-
zation of the North. As relevant as these cases are, they 
only provide snapshots of illicit economies in West 
Africa. In fact, the organized crime link to state fragility 
and instability might not be as straightforward as these 
examples suggest. A whole set of recent case studies 
show the diversity of organized crime and its impact 
on fragile states.5 Against this background, analyzing 
illicit economies6 in Liberia and Sierra Leone in greater 
detail over time is illuminating, as both represent a spe-
cific type of fragility. It stems from a mix of the legacy 
of war economies and new dynamics that have emerged 
in the post-conflict period as parts of incomeplete and 
internationally driven state-building. Quite a few coun-
tries in the region have been, or are undergoing, simi-
lar transitions. Thus, the way organized crime in Liberia 
and Sierra Leone has become affiliated with local power 
structures can be instructive beyond those two cases. 
5  See case studies in: Camino Kavanagh, ed., Getting Smart and 
Scaling Up: Responding to the Impact of Organized Crime on Governance 
in Developing Countries (New York: New York University, Center on 
International Cooperation, June 2013), and Etannibi E. O. Alemika, 
ed., The Impact of Organised Crime on Governance in West Africa (Fried-
rich-Ebert-Stiftung, Regional Office Abuja, August 2013). 
6  The approach of illicit economies has been chosen, as it is 
more suitable for looking into illegal activities over time than 
the more narrow term organized crime. Illicit economies com-
prise transactions and commodities that are legally prohibited 
in production and/or trade unless they comply with respective 
regulations. “Organized criminal groups are generally (but not ex-
clusively) the key operators of illicit economies, given the require-
ment for high levels of organization to facilitate and protect 
repeated transactions,” see Mark Shaw and Fiona Mangan, Illicit 
Trafficking and Libya’s Transition: Profits and Losses (Washington, D.C.: 
United States Institute of Peace, 2014), 7. 
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 The Shadow of Warlord Politics: 
Understanding State Fragility in Liberia and Sierra Leone 
 
Apart from “flying under the radar,” organized crime 
usually relies on two main tools to secure profits: vio-
lence and corruption. Violence indeed was prevalent 
in Liberia and Sierra Leone in the 1990s, and illicit 
activities were at the heart of the war economies at the 
time. However, this link came about through armed 
groups acting as violent entrepreneurs and protectors 
of different business outlets rather than through 
criminal actors turning violent in response to com-
petition or prosecution by the state. But the legacy of 
war economies is nonetheless important for under-
standing illicit economies in these two countries 
today. First, some direct consequences of the war led 
to greater vulnerabilities that could be exploited by 
criminal businesses, namely a (further) decline in 
economic opportunities and an increase in a young 
workforce with little education but traumatic ex-
periences in the wars. The still significant amount 
of weapons circulating in the region further adds to 
this explosive mix. Second, the war economies en-
trenched a system of “warlord politics” that relies 
on the domination of markets, rather than the state 
bureaucracy, to establish authority and political 
networks.7 
Liberia and Sierra Leone in the 1990s have often 
been cited as examples of state failure with an almost 
total breakdown in authority. Although the central 
state was clearly in ruins at times, a kind of new order 
was emerging as well. In addition, at least the Liberian 
civil war has changed the arrangements between West 
African entrepreneurs and overseas partners in the 
global trade of commodities such as timber, diamonds, 
and drugs.8 Beyond factors such as patronage systems 
that date back to pre-war times, these aspects of war 
economies had a specific impact even after the official 
end of the civil wars. Therefore, looking at the evo-
lution of war economies in the 1990s and their trans-
formation after the conflict settlements helps in 
7  William Reno, “Liberia: The LURDs of the New Church,” in 
African Guerrillas: Raging against the Machine, ed. Morten Bøås and 
Kevin C. Dunn (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
2007), 69–80 (71). 
8  Stephen Ellis, The Mask of Anarchy: The Destruction of Liberia 
and the Religious Dimension of an African Civil War (London: Hurst 
& Company, 1999), 27. 
understanding the types of fragility of both states and 
their vulnerabilities to organized crime today. 
Continuity and Change in 
Two (War) Economies 
Clearly much of the trade in West Africa was informal 
and smuggling was common practice across the region 
before the wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Moreover, 
a political-criminal nexus had already emerged in both 
countries. In Liberia President William Tolbert appar-
ently had links to international drug traffickers, and 
under the leadership of his successor, Samuel Doe, 
“a networked and decentralized system based on con-
nections to illicit commerce”9 started to emerge. This 
system comprised shadowy deals with major inter-
national criminals.10 In fact, Doe had already been 
trading timber for guns before the war; Taylor simply 
changed allies and the route for timber exports later. 
Similarly, the governments of Siaka Stevens and Joseph 
Momoh in Sierra Leone entrenched illicit networks 
and practices related to the mineral sector in the 
1970s and 1980s. Momoh was actually ousted from 
power by Valentine Strasser in 1991, allegedly because 
the latter unit’s illicit mining operation had been dis-
rupted by rebel attacks.11 
But with the outbreak of conflict, warlords such 
as Charles Taylor in Liberia surfaced and set out “to 
create a new kind of political authority based on the 
private control of resources.”12 Commercial activities 
provided much-needed income for weapons and other 
materials, but they also manifested power and state-
like authority. In fact, this mode of governing did not 
replace “the state,” but actually mimicked its methods 
and institutions. For example, Taylor installed a “For-
estry Development Authority” in the territory under 
his control and introduced minimum wages in the 
9  Louise Andersen, “Outsiders Inside the State. Post-Conflict 
Liberia between Trusteeship and Partnership,” Journal of Inter-
vention and Statebuilding 4, no. 2 (2010): 129–52 (137). 
10  Ellis, Mask of Anarchy (see note 8), 154–56. 
11  William Reno, Warlord Politics and African States (Boulder and 
London: Lynne Rienner 1998), 123. 
12  Ibid., 91. 
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Continuity and Change in Two (War) Economies 
Map West Africa 
 
logging industry as well as for the largest rubber plan-
tation.13 The public space in Liberia and Sierra Leone 
not only became militarized but increasingly frag-
mented into different zones of authority. The most 
important resources to maintain these were gold and 
diamonds as well as timber and rubber.14 
Even though a plethora of armed actors engaged 
in different economic activities in Liberia and Sierra 
Leone between 1989 and 2003, the core of the war 
economy was the “criminal empire” of Charles Taylor. 
In the process of establishing his authority, he and his 
armed group – the National Patriotic Front of Liberia 
(NPFL) – disrupted some existing commercial chan-
nels, for example through attacks on minority groups 
and foreign traders who were replaced as intermedi-
13  Ellis, Mask of Anarchy (see note 8), 92; Colin M. Waugh, Charles 
Taylor and Liberia: Ambition and Atrocity in Africa’s Lone Star State 
(London and New York: Zed Books, 2011), 193. 
14  Reno, Warlord Politics (see note 11), 79. 
aries,15 while others were simply taken over and main-
tained. Already by late 1990, the NPFL controlled 
almost all of the country outside the capital, including 
important trade nodes such as the port in Buchanan. 
Larger mining companies such as Liberian Minerals 
Company with their iron ore mines in Nimba County 
or the rubber company Firestone now had to rely on 
Taylor’s protection for their operations.16 As part of a 
deal 70,000 tons of iron ore per month were exported 
via Buchanan, accompanied by payments of $80,000 
per month to Taylor between 1991 and 1993 when his 
forces lost control of the port.17 
But there were newcomers to the scene as well such 
as Ivorian, French, and Lebanese business people based 
in Abidjan whom Taylor had met there before the 
15  Ibid., 98. 
16  Ellis, Mask of Anarchy (see note 8), 89–90. 
17  Ibid., 164. Ellis. 
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The Shadow of Warlord Politics: Understanding State Fragility in Liberia and Sierra Leone 
war.18 The logging business became a central part 
of the economy of “Greater Liberia,” as the NPFL-con-
trolled territory was called. Even though it was not 
formally recognized, these activities gave some un-
official international recognition to the “quasi-state.” 
Ivorian-based logging firms were allowed to operate 
in Nimba county and the southeast of Liberia and ex-
port timber, mostly to European states through Cote 
d’Ivoire.19 In 1992, foreign companies traded up to 
200,000 cubic meters of logs worth about $20 mil-
lion.20 Overall, income for the NPFL was mostly derived 
by taxes, fees, payments of salaries to port managers 
or other bodies, as well as material support in the 
form of fuel, oil, or vehicles.21 Taxation systems – 
including for diamond and gold exports – could have 
brought Taylor’s group about $75 million a year, 
according to estimates.22 The trade in looted items 
such as cars or zinc added millions to what was 
exported from Greater Liberia.23 
It was particularly the access to the diamond fields 
that led to Taylor’s involvement in Sierra Leone. He 
supported the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) – a 
Libyan-trained group of Sierra Leoneans led by former 
army corporal Foday Sankoh that invaded the area 
from Liberian territory in 1991.24 The diamond 
mining areas fell to the RUF in November 1992, 
changed hands several times, and remained the center 
of war and the war economy in Sierra Leone until 
2002. Overall, there was a break in established 
patterns of commerce when the RUF attacked 
Lebanese diamond traders and established its own 
marketing links to Liberia. The neighboring country 
became the official export source for diamonds from 
Sierra Leone as well as Guinea and even Angola, so 
that by 1994 Liberia was the third-largest supplier of 
18  Ibid., 89–90. 
19  Waugh, Charles Taylor and Liberia (see note 13), 187; Ellis, Mask 
of Anarchy (see note 8), 165. 
20  Mollai Reeves and Michel Moulard, Postwar Strategy for Forestry 
Development and Environmental Management in Liberia (Monrovia: 
Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs, 1993), cited in Reno, 
Warlord Politics (see note 11), 97. 
21  Reno, Warlord Politics (see note 11), p. 96. 
22  William H. Twaddell, “Testimony to Africa Sub-committee 
of the U.S. House of Representatives,” 1996, The Inquirer, Mon-
rovia 5, no. 55 (August 13, 1996), cited in Ellis, Mask of Anarchy 
(see note 8), 90–91. 
23  Waugh, Charles Taylor and Liberia (see note 13), 188. 
24  Daniel Byman, Peter Chalk, Bruce Hoffman, William Rosenau 
and David Brannan, Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Move-
ments (RAND: National Security Research Division, 2001), 76; 
Ellis, Mask of Anarchy (see note 8), 71. 
diamonds to Antwerp.25 Despite Sierra Leone’s war 
economy being more fragmented – even government 
soldiers continued to engage in mining, sometimes 
collaborating with the RUF26 – the core rational for 
the use of force became making profits. 
But the war economy was not limited to NPFL and 
RUF activities. When Taylor’s forces lost the northwest 
of Liberia to the “United Liberation Movement of Liberia 
for Democracy” (ULIMO) and the ECOWAS27 Cease-Fire 
Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) took over the port of 
Buchanan in 1993, these actors continued the busi-
ness previously undertaken or sustained by their rivals. 
ULIMO supporters, for example, mined diamonds on 
both sides of the border to Guinea.28 In doing so, the 
group followed the scheme of the NPFL by distributing 
opportunities for the alluvial mining of diamonds 
and gold in order to maintain control over fighters. 
A splinter group of ULIMO sold weapons for stones to 
fighters who, in turn, had the right to set up road-
blocks, loot, or engage in the diamond trade. In fact, 
both ULIMO and the NPFL became “like a marketing 
franchise” for smaller groups of fighters controlling 
territory and resources.29 
ECOMOG officers were also active in the protection 
business and some local commanders became engaged 
in mining. Moreover, ECOMOG units traded looted 
goods or resources, such as rubber, with ULIMO and 
other armed factions.30 The initially strong Ivorian 
presence was challenged by Nigerians, who were 
dominant among the ranks of ECOMOG and partially 
took over Liberian businesses.31 This might have played 
a role in the drug trade as well. Initially, marihuana 
grown in northern Liberia was exported by the NPFL 
via Buchanan and San Pedro in Cote d’Ivoire, where 
Ivorian, French, Lebanese, and other crime syndicates 
operated.32 But Nigerian officials might have seized 
the opportunities Liberia offered for the narcotics 
trade as well.33 
In general, the control over resources by different 
armed groups changed over time, but the practices 
and affiliates often remained the same. The remnants 
25  Waugh, Charles Taylor and Liberia (see note 13), 188. 
26  Reno, Warlord Politics (see note 11), 56 and 127–28. 
27  Economic Community of West African States. 
28  Reno, Warlord Politics (see note 11), 103. 
29  Ellis, Mask of Anarchy (see note 8), 104. 
30  Reno, Warlord Politics (see note 11), 105; Ellis, Mask of Anarchy 
(see note 8), 104. 
31  Waugh, Charles Taylor and Liberia (see note 13), 186. 
32  Ellis, Mask of Anarchy (see note 8), 90–91. 
33  Ibid., 171. 
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State-building and the Transformation of Warlord Politics 
of the central states had little influence outside the 
capital cities. But governments also used links to 
foreign businesses in order to regain some force. For 
example, the South African security company Execu-
tive Outcomes was brought in by the Sierra Leonean 
government in 1995 to recapture the eastern diamond 
mining areas. Apart from initial payments for its ser-
vices, the deal later reportedly included favored com-
mercial arrangements in conquered territory for the 
company if it was going to undertake exploitation 
of and trade in resources.34 In fact, it was around this 
time that the diamond mining areas in Kono and 
Tongo Field became the prime focus of the RUF for 
fundraising.35 
Clearly, the wars had made categories of state and 
non-state actors – and similarly “licit” or “illicit” – 
undistinguishable. An embodiment of this develop-
ment was the phenomenon of “sobels” in Sierra Leone, 
a term blending “soldier” and “rebel” to refer to those 
involved in military operations who increasingly 
engaged in acts of banditry. The peace process, how-
ever, added a new dimension to this. Several peace 
settlements were negotiated over the course of the 
1990s in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Based on these 
agreements, armed actors who engaged in illicit eco-
nomic activities became part of official state institu-
tions. In Liberia the 1993 Cotonou Agreement and the 
1995 Abuja Agreement led to the inclusion of various 
armed factions into government, giving them access 
to state facilities.36 Finally, in 1997, Charles Taylor 
himself became elected president of Liberia,37 just as 
the 1999 Lomé Peace Accord in neighboring Sierra 
Leone made RUF leader Sankoh Vice-President and left 
him in charge of the diamond mines. Even though 
none of the settlements lasted, they marked the begin-
ning of a longer transition period. The initial arrange-
ments mostly led to a redistribution of positions and 
the integration of “warlords” into state institutions 
without curbing the core of war economies. When 
this setup largely failed to secure peace, international 
actors sought to (re)establish a framework of legality. 
34  Reno, Warlord Politics (see note 11), 131. 
35  United Nations Security Council (UNSC), Report of the Panel 
of Experts appointed pursuant to Security Council resolution 1306 (2000), 
paragraph 19, in relation to Sierra Leone, December 20, 2000, S/2000/ 
1195, 16. 
36  Ellis, Mask of Anarchy (see note 8), 101–02, and 107. 
37  Later UN investigations showed that the transshipment of 
diamonds involved about $70 million annually (UNSC, Panel 
of Experts, December 20, 2000). 
State-building and the Transformation of 
Warlord Politics 
The initial peace agreements provided incentives for 
other violent entrepreneurs to seek their “share of the 
cake.” At the heart of this struggle still was the export 
of natural resources, particularly minerals, “which 
required little or no investment in plant, infrastruc-
ture or machinery.”38 Therefore, a set of UN sanctions 
was installed to deprive state and non-state actors of 
this source such as the ban of direct or indirect import 
of all rough diamonds from Sierra Leone through 
Security Council resolution 1306 (2000) and from 
Liberia based on resolution 1343 (2001) as well as the 
embargo on Liberian timber and timber products 
through resolution 1521 (2003). Although the distinc-
tion between legal and illegal economic activities 
in Liberia and Sierra Leone had become completely 
blurred by warlord politics and their inclusion in offi-
cial state structures, now there was an outside mecha-
nism defining legality. It was no coincidence that 
the civil wars ended relatively soon after, in 2003 and 
2002,39 respectively. Even though the resolutions were 
not the only relevant factors, they were the prime 
means for removing access to sources of income for 
those who continued fighting. 
The economies had slipped into shadowy terrain at 
best. Very few employment opportunities in the already 
weak licit private sector remained. At the same time, 
a large group of former fighters from the different 
armed factions had to be (re)integrated. Ex-combatants 
often developed physical and psychological problems 
and had gotten used to the abuse of alcohol and 
drugs such as marihuana, amphetamines, and crack 
cocaine.40 Many of them were engaged in illicit activ-
ities – particularly diamond mining in the Liberia-
Sierra Leone border areas – during and in some cases 
already before the war.41 Furthermore, parts of the 
38  Ellis, Mask of Anarchy (see note 8), 184–85. 
39  Armed conflict in Liberia lasted from 1989 to 2003, with 
an interruption between 1996 and 1999 when Charles Taylor 
became elected president of Liberia. These two periods are often 
referred to as the first and second Liberian civil wars. In Sierra 
Leone, armed conflict started in March 1991 and basically con-
tinued until early 2002. 
40  Ellis, Mask of Anarchy (see note 8), 127; Ibrahim Abdullah and 
Patrick Muana, “The Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone: 
A Revolt of the Lumpenproletariat,” in African Guerillas, ed. Chris-
topher Clapham (Oxford and Bloomington: James Currey, 1998), 
172–93 (190). 
41  Abdullah and Muana, “The Revolutionary United Front of 
Sierra Leone” (see note 40), 179. 
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Timeline: civil wars and peace processes* 
  
Liberia 
1989 – National Patriotic Front of Liberia, led by 
Charles Taylor, starts fight against government. 
1990 – ECOWAS sends intervention force (ECOMOG) 
under Nigerian leadership. President Samuel Doe 
is executed by a splinter group of the NPFL. 
1993 – Cotonou Agreement signed by main armed 
factions giving NPFL and ULIMO representation 
in government; establishment of UN Observer 
Mission in Liberia, but fighting continues within 
months. 
1995 – Abuja Agreement establishes Transitional 
Government; allocation of ministries, corpora-
tions, and agencies as agreed in the agreement. 
1996 – Heavy fighting and destruction of Monrovia 
only ends in August with another deal brokered 
at an ECOWAS meeting in Abuja. 
1997 – Charles Taylor wins presidential election. 
1999 – Liberia accused of supporting RUF rebels in 
Sierra Leone; start of second Liberian civil war 
with invasion of a rebel group called Liberians 
United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD). 
2001 May – UN Security Council reimposes arms 
embargo as Taylor has been trading weapons for 
diamonds from rebels in Sierra Leone. 
2002 February – Rebels approach Monrovia and 
Taylor declares state of emergency. 
2003 – Another rebel group, called Movement for 
Democracy in Liberia (MODEL), emerges and 
fighting intensifies. 
2003 August – Nigerian peacekeepers arrive. Charles 
Taylor leaves Liberia after handing power to his 
deputy. Interim government and rebels sign 
peace accord. 
2003 September–October – UN launches major 
peacekeeping mission. 
2005 November – Ellen Johnson Sirleaf is elected as 
new head of state. 
 Sierra Leone 
1991 – Revolutionary United Front under Foday 
Sankoh starts campaign against President 
Momoh on border with Liberia. 
1992 – President Momoh ousted in military coup 
led by Captain Strasser. 
1996 January – Strasser ousted in military coup, 
followed by elections in February, making Ahmad 
Tejan Kabbah new president; in November signa-
ture of peace accord with the RUF. 
1997 – Peace deal unravels. Army deposes President 
Kabbah, who flees to Guinea. 
1997 October – UN Security Council imposes army 
embargo on Sierra Leone. 
1998 February – ECOMOG drives rebels out of Free-
town and Kabbah returns. 
1999 January – Rebels reinvade Freetown and seize 
parts of the city from ECOMOG, but are driven 
out again after weeks of fierce fighting. 
1999 July – Lomé Peace Agreement gives rebels 
posts in government and grants them amnesty. 
UN troops arrive to monitor peace agreement 
in November/December. 
2000 April/May – UN forces come under attack and 
some are abducted. Rebels close in on Freetown; 
British paratroopers help secure the airport for 
UN peacekeepers. 
2001 May – Start of disarmament of rebels and 
deployment of British-trained Sierra Leone army 
in rebel-held areas. 
2002 January – War declared over; UN agrees to set 
up the Special Court for Sierra Leone. 
2002 May – Kabbah clearly wins elections. 
2005 December – Last UN peacekeeping troops leave 
Sierra Leone; opening of UN assistance mission. 
2006 March – Liberian ex-president Charles Taylor 
is arrested in Nigeria and handed over to the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone. 
2007 August – Presidential and parliamentary elec-
tions lead to a change in power with Ernest Bai 
Koroma as new president. 
*  These timelines are extracted from the cited literature 
on the civil wars as well as the BBC Country Profiles for 
Liberia: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13732188 
 And Sierra Leone: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-
14094419 (accessed on November 6, 2014). 
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command-and-control chains of armed factions 
remained intact. In fact, vigilante groups and other 
schemes providing protection along former rebel 
structures became a common occurrence.42 In com-
bination with a lack of income opportunities for 
the youth in general, this clearly had the potential 
to be easily mobilized by violent or criminal entre-
preneurs.43 
The other important heritage from the armed con-
flicts was the structure and the functioning logic of 
war economies. These were neither entirely illicit nor 
were illicit activities a product of the civil wars. In 
fact, before the outbreak of armed conflict, both coun-
tries had barely formalized economies and strongly 
entrenched patronage systems. However, emerging 
“warlord politics” added a special flavor to this. First 
of all, the room for “nodes” of organized criminals 
connected with governance structures and formal 
private enterprises increased.44 With competing vio-
lent actors having control over different areas, natural 
resources in these zones in particular were a critical 
source of income and influence. Furthermore, the 
already unclear line between licit and illicit became 
completely blurred, as rebel groups and government 
actors engaged in “do it yourself” forms of organized 
crime,45 but also collaborated with or provided pro-
tection for criminal networks, formal foreign com-
panies, as well as obscure businessmen and middle-
men. The ultimate aim of international engagement, 
therefore, was to (re)build the state and, in doing so, 
the line between legal and illegal activities. 
But naturally, the first concern of international 
engagement in Liberia and Sierra Leone was to keep 
the peace and prevent a relapse into warfare. The 
processes of demobilizing and reintegrating fighters 
and security sector reform were core components of 
42  Mariam Persson, “Demobilized or Remobilized? Lingering 
Rebel Structures in Post-war Liberia,” in African Conflicts and 
Informal Power: Big Men and Networks, ed. Mats Utas (The Nordic 
Africa Institute & London and New York: Zed Books, 2012),  
101–18 (106–08). 
43  Maya Mynster Christensen, “Big Man Business in the Border-
land of Sierra Leone,” in African Conflicts and Informal Power, ed. 
Utas (see note 42), 60–77 (64–65). 
44  Mats Utas, “Introduction: Bigmanity and Network Govern-
ance in African Conflicts,” in African Conflicts and Informal Power, 
ed. Utas (see note 42), 1–31 (5). 
45  Phil Williams and John T. Picarelli, “Combating Organized 
Crime in Armed Conflict,” in Profiting from Peace: Managing the 
Resource Dimensions of Civil War, ed. Karen Ballentine and Heiko 
Nitzschke (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner, 2005), 123–52 
(125). 
the UN missions from the start.46 Apart from the sanc-
tions mentioned, as well as others that included travel 
bans and asset-freezing, the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone was set up in 2002. Ultimately, it indicted 13 
persons, including Charles Taylor, who was sentenced 
to 50 years of imprisonment in May 2012. Despite these 
efforts, central actors of the war economies moved 
into new positions of authority as part of the state-
building project. Some remain(ed) under scrutiny of 
the UN sanctions regime for Liberia, but other violent 
entrepreneurs certainly managed to “use post-conflict 
privatization programmes and elections as opportuni-
ties to launder their looted assets and their coerced 
legitimacy”47 – as in peace processes elsewhere. 
Specific practices and business partnerships were 
maintained as well. It has been observed in the con-
text of other post-war transitions, for example in 
Bosnia, that experiences in illegal activities as well 
as networks between state and criminal actors estab-
lished during wartime are difficult to dismantle.48 
Indeed, the illegal trade in natural resources during 
the wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone cannot be reduced 
to armed groups in search of financing arms and 
operations; it was grounded in a business network 
comprising heads of state, international companies, 
organized criminals, and patronage networks.49 
Although the core of war economies was sanctioned 
and armed conflicts ultimately stopped, existing 
practices and networks did not simply go away with 
the demobilization and (re)integration of armed 
groups. In this context, international actors such as 
the UN missions in both countries engaged in the 
complex undertaking of state-building. The initial 
mandate of UNMIL already included the task of as-
sisting the transitional government in restoring the 
46  The former Special Representative of the UN Secretary-Gen-
eral in Liberia, Alan Doss, attributes this particular approach 
to the bilateral support of the United Kingdom and the United 
States, respectively, for the reforms, see Alan Doss, “In the Foot-
steps of Dr. Bunche: The Congo, UN Peacekeeping and the Use 
of Force,” Journal of Strategic Studies 37, no. 5 (2014): 703–35 (732). 
47  James Cockayne, “Crime, Corruption and Violent Econo-
mies,” in Ending Wars, Consolidating Peace: Economic Perspectives, ed. 
Mats Berdal and Achim Wennmann (London: The International 
Institute for Strategic Studies, 2010), 189–218 (202). 
48  Williams and Picarelli, “Combating Organized Crime” 
(see note 45), 134. 
49  Wibke Hansen, Mehr Interaktion als geplant: Friedenseinsätze und 
Organisierte Kriminalität in fragile Staaten, Wissenschaftliche Schrif-
ten der WWU Münster, Series VII, Vol. 12 (2013), 187. 
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proper governance of natural resources.50 In both 
countries, a whole set of reform programs tried to 
address the weak regulation and institutional set-
up, for example of the security sector. These efforts 
created a new framework of legality that, however, 
was strongly driven from the outside. The remaining 
networks and practices from the civil wars often con-
tinued to operate within this framework, but also 
readjusted to it. Moreover, with a more stable – if still 
fragile – security environment and shifts in global 
markets, new illicit activities emerged in both coun-




50  Resolution 1509 (2003), adopted by the Security Council at its 
4830th meeting, on September 19, 2003, S/RES/1509 (2003), 4. 
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 Illicit Economies and Organized Crime in Liberia and Sierra Leone 
 
In the global shadow economy, Liberia and Sierra 
Leone are not of major importance as markets. There 
is a demand for illegal goods produced in the region 
(marihuana or hunting weapons) and lower-priced 
goods that are smuggled (rice, fuel, faked medicines). 
But, as in the case of natural resources, the key mar-
kets for hard drugs are outside the region. So cocaine 
and heroin are mostly passing through West Africa. 
Fragile and conflict-affected states such as Liberia and 
Sierra Leone are seen as being particularly vulnerable 
to the activities of criminal networks. But what do the 
illicit economies really look like today and what do 
they tell us about the vulnerabilities of the two coun-
tries to organized crime? Where does the legacy of war 
(economies) play a role, and where can new dynamics 
be identified? 
By now, crimes related to natural resources and 
drugs – more precisely, cocaine – are rated the most 
dangerous for the stability of West African states by 
the UN Office on Drugs and Crime.51 Moreover, the 
illicit activities linked to those goods, including can-
nabis, have important implications for livelihood and 
economic development.52 This holds particularly true 
for Liberia and Sierra Leone, where the peace pro-
cesses were accompanied by a transformation of the 
state, and thus of illicit economies. 
Illegal Extraction and Trade of Legal Goods: 
Natural Resources 
The post-war periods have been marked by efforts to 
regulate and control activities that previously were at 
the core of war economies. However, continuing illicit 
activities in the trade with gold, diamonds and timber 
show that these measures have been partially effective 
at best. Both Liberia and Sierra Leone have been par-
51  United Office on Drugs and Crime, Crime and Instability: Case 
Studies of Transnational Threats (Vienna: UNODC, February 2010), 16. 
52  Naturally, there are other forms of crime such as human 
trafficking or the trade in counterfeit goods that clearly play a 
role in Liberia and Sierra Leone. However, due to the complex 
nature of each of these sectors and the difficulty in accessing 
information, the focus here is on the core part of illicit econo-
mies.  
ties to the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme 
since 2007 and 2003, respectively. The scheme regu-
lates the commerce with precious stones in order to 
prevent “conflict diamonds”53 from entering the 
world market. In short, the scheme is about traceabil-
ity: from production to export by certification. 
Therefore, all related activities – from mining and 
dealing to exporting – require licenses. The market for 
gold is much less formalized, though in Liberia and 
Sierra Leone artisanal miners and dealers theoretically 
need to acquire a license as well and exporters also 
have to pay taxes. 
From Conflict to Crime Minerals? 
Exploitation and Trade of Diamonds and Gold 
Industrial mining in diamonds and gold beyond 
exploration is still at low levels in both countries.54 
Most companies with licenses are still in the explora-
tion phase; only Octea in the Kono District of Sierra 
Leone has engaged in larger-scale mining of diamonds 
over a longer period, though under changing names. 
The remaining mining activities are small-scale and 
include the use of light machinery or artisanal mining, 
which is central to the livelihoods of young men who 
do the physically challenging job of digging and are 
often said to be ex-combatants.55 Usually, they are work-
ing in groups under a “miner” who supports them 
with equipment, food, etc., and who can be the license-
holder or merely a facilitator. Diamond brokers or 
dealers in both countries are often of Lebanese origin 
but also come from different West African countries. 
The gold trade similarly works through middlemen or 
53  These are “rough diamonds used by rebel movements to 
finance wars against legitimate governments” according to 
the Kimberley Process; see: http://www.kimberleyprocess.com 
(accessed August 11, 2014). 
54  However, there have been a lot of non-performing licenses, 
see: Richard Fanthorpe and Christopher Gabelle, Political Economy 
of Extractives Governance in Sierra Leone (Washington, D.C.: World 
Bank, July 2013), 43. Moreover, there is industrial exploitation 
of other resources such as iron ore that has risen to significant 
levels in both countries. 
55  Interview LIB-27_26-11-13. 
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companies buying from miners, including European, 
Indian, and Chinese companies.56 
Illicit activities remain common at different inter-
faces in the commercial chain of the mineral sectors 
in Liberia and Sierra Leone. The most recent review 
mission of the Kimberley Process to Liberia in March 
2013 found “evidence of routine smuggling of Sierra 
Leonean diamonds and their certification by Liberia, 
evidence of illicit diamond mining in many parts of 
Liberia and a high likelihood that conflict diamonds 
from Côte d’Ivoire, under a United Nations embargo at 
the time of the mission, were being processed through 
the Liberian system.”57 
Even for Sierra Leone, more recent estimates of the 
value of diamonds lost to smuggling are between 50 
percent and 90 percent of total production.58 As the 
regulatory regime for gold is weak in both countries, 
the assumption usually is that much of it bypasses 
the system of certification.59 In 2013, the UN Panel 
of Experts on Liberia noted that illicit mining and 
trafficking of gold in the country “continues almost 
entirely unhindered.”60 
Illicit mining in gold and diamonds usually is 
artisanal.61 The UN Panel of Experts on Liberia con-
cluded in June 2014 that thousands of ex-combatants 
who are often still tied to their former commanders 
are engaged in illicit mining in Liberia.62 For alluvial 
gold mining, there are even estimates that only about 
20 percent of those engaged have a license.63 In Sierra 
Leone, the system for legalizing artisanal mining in 
diamonds is stronger and incentives to attain a license 
are relatively high.64 There, illicit artisanal mining has 
also decreased due to a reduction in the amount of 
56  Interviews LIB-3_13-11-2013; SL-26_29-1-14; LIB-14_20-11-13; 
SL-8_20-1-14; SL-29_30-1-14. 
57  Cited in United Nations Security Council, Midterm report of the 
Panel of Experts on Liberia submitted pursuant to paragraph 5 (b) of 
Security Council resolution 2128 (2013), May 23, 2014, S/2014/363, 18. 
58  Fanthorpe and Gabelle, Political Economy of Extractives Govern-
ance (see note 54), 22. 
59  Interviews LIB-33_28-11-13; LIB-3_13-11-2013; SL-24_28-1-14. 
60  United Nations Security Council, Final report of the Panel of 
Experts on Liberia submitted pursuant to paragraph 5 (f) of Security 
Council resolution 2079 (2012), November 25, 2013, S/2013/683, 33. 
61  This does not rule out irregularities in the small-scale and 
industrial sectors, but generally these forms of mining are dif-
ficult or impossible to pursue entirely clandestinely. At least in 
Sierra Leone, however, illicit small-scale operations supported 
by local officials have been mentioned occasionally (Interviews 
SL-26_29-1-14; SL-35_3-2-14). 
62  UN Panel of Experts, Midterm report, May 2014 (see note 57), 19. 
63  Interview LIB-1_12-11-2013. 
64  Interview SL-30_30-1-14. 
stones that lie close to the surface and can be easily 
exploited.65 
There is no consistent data on illicit mining, partly 
because there are few arrests, or those caught are 
released after paying a fine or a bribe.66 But there are 
clear indications that illicit mining of diamonds and 
gold in both countries is still widespread. The arrange-
ments of these activities can differ. Some diamond 
brokers or dealers have young men mining for them,67 
in other cases these “patrons” are local officials or 
other persons with power. Some of these operations 
might be legal, but others are certainly undertaken 
without a license.68 Some illicit miners have the back-
ing of landowners or traditional authorities who are 
custodians of the land in parts of Sierra Leone.69 Fre-
quently, people also “share” one license, or someone 
engaged in illicit mining legalizes the findings by 
selling them to a claim holder.70 
What all these arrangements have in common is 
that ultimately their products are either legalized by 
being sold to a licensed dealer inside the country or 
smuggled abroad. In both practices, illegal diamond 
dealers or brokers can be involved. For example, in 
Sierra Leone the “Open Yai” (Open Eye) markets are 
well-established places for the illegal trade in dia-
monds.71 When illicitly mined and traded stones or 
gold are infused in the legal market before export, 
the state receives at least some revenue. Different rates 
of taxation and systems of certification in the region, 
however, also provide incentives for smuggling. Sierra 
Leone’s Mines and Minerals Act of 2009 raised the tax 
for precious stones to 6.5 percent, and to 15 percent 
for special stones above a market value of $500,000.72 
When the tax was enacted, there were no official ex-
ports whatsoever the following six months, whereas 
exports of Guinea and Liberia increased.73 Similarly, 
there was a clear drop in exports for gold after the Act 
raised the tax to 5 percent.74 When the government 
65  Interview SL-8_20-1-14. 
66  Nina Engwicht, Illegal Markets in Post-conflict Societies: The Sierra 
Leonean Diamond Market, Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschafts-
forschung, MPIfG Discussion Paper, forthcoming, 8. 
67  Interviews LIB-37_2-12-13; SL-39_4-2-14. 
68  Interviews SL-35_3-2-14;SL-35_3-2-14; LIB-14_20-11-13. 
69  Interviews SL-38_4-2-14; SL-45_7-2-14. 
70  Interviews SL-40_4-2-14; SL-39_4-2-14. 
71  Engwicht, Illegal Markets (see note 66), 4. 
72  Government Printing Department of Sierra Leone, The Mines 
and Minerals Act 2009, Supplement to the Sierra Leone Gazette 
Vol. CXLI, No. 3, dated January 7, 2010, 116. 
73  Interviews SL-30_30-1-14; SC, SL-20_27-1-14. 
74  Interview SL-20_27-1-14. 
SWP Berlin 
Organized Crime and State-building in  







Illegal Extraction and Trade of Legal Goods: Natural Resources 
subsequently lowered taxes for normal diamonds to 
3 percent again, it led to a partial recovery in export 
numbers. However, trafficking from Sierra Leone 
continues, not least because the 15 percent tax for 
special stones remains in place. The Government Gold 
and Diamond Office noted a significant decrease in 
the trade of special stones from Sierra Leone, with not 
even a single diamond of that kind exported in 2012 
at all. In fact, only two such stones have been exported 
in total since 2009 – one apparently “accidentally” 
because the exporter did not know about the tax.75 
Whereas these stones seem to go to Liberia mostly, 
lower-value diamonds are usually smuggled from 
Liberia to buyers in Sierra Leone.76 But Guinea 
remains a destination as well due to a very weak 
Kimberley Process and partly due to lower taxes.77 
Diamonds are also smuggled into Sierra Leone from 
diamond-producing countries outside the region.78 
Gold from Liberia seems to go mostly to Côte d’Ivoire 
and Guinea, “where it is smelted into bullion and then 
trafficked on to the United Arab Emirates; there, it is 
sold on the international market.”79 
All kinds of actors are involved in smuggling, in-
cluding licensed and illicit dealers or middlemen who 
buy up gold or diamonds and bring them abroad.80 
Such a trafficker from Sierra Leone reveals why very 
few cases of smuggling are ever exposed: “It is very 
easy to smuggle a diamond. You can put it in your 
[shirt] hem or on your body. They [the police] try to 
catch smugglers but they can’t. Many border crossings 
are unmanned. I just take my motorbike.”81 Gold and 
diamonds bought by foreign investors, for example 
from Europe or the Middle East, also exit illegally 
through airports or ports to faraway destinations such 
as Dubai.82 
Such investors occasionally fall victim to another 
criminal phenomenon: “419 scams”83 with faked gold 
75  Interview SL-20_27-1-14. 
76  UN Panel of Experts, Final report, November 25, 2013 
(see note 60), 32. 
77  Interviews SL-2_16-1-14; SL-30_30-1-14. 
78  Engwicht, Illegal Markets (see note 66), 16. 
79  UN Panel of Experts, Final report, November 25, 2013  
(see note 60), 33. 
80  Interviews SL-44_6-2-14; SL-24_28-1-14; SL-49_3-2-14. 
81  “Sierra Leone: Diamond Smuggler, ‘It Is Worth It to Steal,’” 
IRIN News, July 28, 2009. 
82  Interview LIB-3_13-11-2013. 
83  This term refers to advance fee fraud. The respective article 
of the Nigerian Criminal Code dealing with fraud “419” has 
given it its name because this is a common type of cybercrime 
in Nigeria. 
or diamonds, particularly in Sierra Leone. Usually 
façade businesses are set up to attract foreign inves-
tors who initially receive real stones or gold, which are 
replaced by faked ones after the investor has paid an 
advance fee or tax.84 Records on the exact proceedings 
of such scams differ, some stating that fraudsters pro-
vide faked certificates and parcels for export to inves-
tors;85 others asserting that there are payments to offi-
cials who provide original documents and protection;86 
and yet others who claim that the whole process for 
getting the export papers is done properly before the 
minerals are replaced at the last moment, for example 
at the airport when investors are leaving.87 In May 
2014, the US State Department published a warning 
on fraud and fake Kimberley Process certificates for 
Sierra Leone, referring to a scheme with individuals 
“invited to Sierra Leone to view rough diamonds that 
were later evaluated as fake stones and were also 
provided with a fake Kimberley Process certificate 
numbered Sierra Leone 004199, issued in either April 
or May 2014.”88 
More cases, however, seem to occur with faked 
gold.89 Apparently, fraudsters mostly come from 
Liberia, Sierra Leone, or the surrounding region and 
operate in small groups. However, in order to set up 
offices and a credible façade for investors, they need 
to have some capital and a certain degree of organiza-
tion.90 Allegedly, the police have also been implicated 
in some cases involving faked diamonds in Sierra 
Leone and arrested investors, but not the sellers, who 
were able to escape.91 There are no insights on how 
frequent these scams are, but most likely many are 
not reported.92 Sometimes this might be due to the 
dubious backgrounds of the investors themselves. Cer-
tainly, the purchase of minerals with cash is common 
and is believed to be used to launder money, for 
example by Eastern European mafias,93 even though 
these are likely to represent limited investments in 
84  Interview SL-1_15-1-14. 
85  Interview SL-5_17-1-14. 
86  Interviews SL-27_29-1-14; SL-5_17-1-14. 
87  Interview SL-11_21-1-14. 
88  Department of State, Bureau of Economic and Business 
Affairs, Fraud Warning and Fake Kimberley Process Certificates for 
Sierra Leone and Guinea (Washington, D.C., May 9, 2014), http:// 
www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/05/225925.htm (accessed August 
13, 2014). 
89  Interview SL-5_17-1-14. 
90  Interview SL-27_29-1-14. 
91  Interview SL-1_15-1-14. 
92  Interview SL-49_3-2-14. 
93  Interview SL-8_20-1-14. 
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relation to the sums laundered in countries with 
better financial infrastructures.94 
Shifting between the Light and the Grey Zone: 
The Logging Industry 
The illicit economy around minerals is a good 
example of how remnants of previous networks and 
practices persist while state-building also infuses 
doses of change. This also holds true for another core 
component of previous war economies: the logging 
industry. However, operations in this sector differ 
significantly. A large part of the timber business is 
conducted by or linked to bigger companies. Locals are 
doing the labor-intensive work of cutting trees; there 
also is a local market, mostly for charcoal made from 
timber, but the “big business” is in international 
exports. 
Because illegally traded timber requires a higher 
level of logistics compared to diamonds and gold and 
demand is strongest in Asia, practices and actors differ 
as well. 
Furthermore, both countries saw bans on logging 
after the end of the civil wars, rendering the trade in 
timber illegal. In Liberia, the international embargo 
remained effective until 2006. Although it was central 
to pacifying the country, the industry did not funda-
mentally change. The forest sector was reformed and 
new logging licenses were granted, but some return-
ing companies are said to have been operating earlier 
under different names.95 At the very least, some 
prominent figures from Taylor’s time remain linked to 
specific companies. Finally, seven large Forest 
Management Contracts and ten small Timber Sale 
Contracts were issued by the Liberian government, but 
the process was marred by violations. More important-
ly, private-use permits (PUPs) emerged as a new legal 
loophole.96 A PUP is one category of commercial for-
estry licenses that was introduced to allow private 
landowners to utilize forest assets situated on their 
property.97 By 2012, there were 66 such licenses 
designed for small-scale use, which did not require 
94  Interviews SL-8_20-1-14; SL-30_30-1-14. 
95  Interview LIB-38_2-12-13. 
96  Global Witness, Save My Future Foundation and Sustainable 
Development Initiative, Signing Their Lives Away: Liberia’s Private Use 
Permits and the Destruction of Community-Owned Rainforest (September 
2012), 2. 
97  Special Independent Investigating Body, Report on the Issuance 
of Private Use Permits (PUPs), (December 19, 2012), vii. 
the payment of any taxes. There was increasing 
evidence that the process lacked any formal standards 
and that “Liberian landowners were cajoled into 
signing PUPs under false pretenses.”98 
An audit revealed that none of the PUPs had com-
plied with national forest laws and regulations.99 
Moreover, despite a moratorium placed on the issuance 
of new PUPs in February 2012 and the use of existing 
PUPs (with the exception of four that were already 
operating), the shipment of timber continued un-
abated. The moratorium was briefly lifted in Septem-
ber and October 2012, but an investigative report 
revealed that operations had never really stopped.100 
Among those continuously engaged was Atlantic 
Resources, a company linked to the Malaysian logging 
giant Samling, which shipped out illegal timber in 
breach of the ban.101 The investigating body recom-
mended barring the company from any commercial 
forestry in Liberia due to its engagement in fraud and 
illegal activities. In the end, 61 PUPs are undergoing 
review, but as the Forest Development Agency decided 
to allow already felled logs to be sold, “the risk remains 
that the Government will sell illegally harvested tim-
ber on the international market.”102 
Similarly, Sierra Leone placed a ban on timber 
exports and suspended all concession operations 
by January 2008 due to allegations that foreign com-
panies had engaged in illicit activities.103 Again it 
became clear that exports continued illegally when 
98  Jacey Fortin, “Liberian Timber Wars Pit Poverty-Stricken Com-
munities against Secretive Big Loggers Given an Opening by 
the Government,” International Business Times, September 8, 2012, 
http://www.ibtimes.com/liberian-timber-wars-pit-poverty-stricken-
communities-against-secretive-big-loggers-given-opening 
(accessed August 19, 2014). 
99  Patrick Hettinger and Janice James, African Economic Outlook, 
Liberia 2014 (African Development Bank, OECD Development 
Centre and United Nations Development Programme 2014), 9, 
http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/fileadmin/uploads/aeo/ 
2014/PDF/CN_Long_EN/Liberia_EN.pdf (accessed August 25, 2014). 
100  Special Independent Investigating Body, December 19, 
2012, 8. 
101  “Logging Company Flouts Liberian President’s Timber Ex-
port Ban and Drives Breakdown in Rule of Law,” Global Witness, 
December 21, 2012, http://www.globalwitness.org/library/ 
logging-company-flouts-liberian-president%E2%80%99s-timber-
export-ban-and-drives-breakdown-rule-law (accessed August 2, 
2014). 
102  UN Panel of Experts, Final report, November 25, 2013 
(see note 60), 36. 
103  Summer Walker and Elisa Burchert, “A Desk Study of Sierra 
Leone,” in Getting Smart and Scaling Up (see note 5), (New York: 
Center on International Cooperation, 2013), 161–96 (178). 
SWP Berlin 
Organized Crime and State-building in  







Trafficking of Illegal Goods: The Drug Trade 
containers destined for East Asia and labeled as scrap 
metals were intercepted by the Anti-Corruption Com-
mission at the Freetown port in 2011.104 Overall, it 
turned out that there were 33 containers of timber 
with three exporting companies from Sierra Leone 
and Guinea involved. Finally, out of 25 people charged 
in the cases, 18 were convicted. Interestingly, some of 
these were also linked to the “Timbergate” affair.105 
This scandal was triggered by an Al-Jazeera undercover 
story allegedly implicating two associates of Vice-
President Sam Sumana, who accepted bribes in return 
for the promise that the vice president would back an 
illegal logging project.106 Although Sumana himself 
was not charged and remained in office, a trial was 
opened against the associates.107 The paramount chief 
of the area foreseen for the fictitious logging deal 
seemed to be involved as well but was not prosecuted. 
It is a general assumption in Sierra Leone that para-
mount chiefs tend to be implicated in illegal logging, 
as it can barely take place without their knowledge.108 
They are the first entry point for any activity in an 
area, and by law they receive surface rents from com-
panies operating legally on land in their chiefdom.109 
A paper by the EU Commission concludes that after 
the ban “illegal logging is often managed by Lebanese 
from Guinea Conakry and Liberia, who obtain agree-
ments with chiefs and employ local people.”110 With 
demand highest in East Asian countries, particularly 
Chinese organizations are believed to be behind log-
ging operations, whether as financiers or with a more 
prominent role in shipping out the wood from Sierra 
Leone, Liberia, or another country in the region.111 
104  “S. Leone Anti-graft Agency Stops Illegal Timber Exports,” 
Mano Daily and AFP, February 10, 2011, http://www.nanodaily. 
com/reports/SLeone_anti-graft_agency_stops_illegal_timber_ 
exports_999.html (accessed August 22, 2014). 
105  Interview SL-2_16-1-14. 
106  “Sierra Leone Charges Two in ‘Timbergate’ Graft Case,” 
Reuters, April 17, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/ 
17/sierraleone-corruption-idUSL6E8FHBPO20120417 (accessed 
August 22, 2014). 
107  Walker and Burchert, “A Desk Study of Sierra Leone” 
(see note 103), 168. 
108  Interviews SL-26_29-1-14; SL-33_3-2-14. 
109  Felix Marco Conteh, “Chiefs, NGOs and Alternative Conflict 
Resolution Mechanisms in Post-conflict Sierra Leone,” Review of 
African Political Economy (online), (2014), 1–14 (7). 
110  European Commission, Cross-border Flows of Timber and Wood 
Products in West Africa, Final Report by Hugh Blackett & Dr. Eric 
Gardette, Contract Reference: 2007/146818, October 20, 2008, 59. 
111  Interviews SL-27_29-1-14; SL-29_30-1-14; SL-47_8-2-14. This 
also holds true for another sector with substantive illicit exploi-
tation of an increasingly scarce resource: fishery. Mostly boats 
Generally, the illicit economy around natural resources 
in both countries has persisted, despite new regula-
tions and institution-building after the civil wars. But 
it has also adapted to the new state framework and 
changes in demand. The latter factor was also a strong 
driver of a more recent phenomenon: cocaine traf-
ficking through the region. 
Trafficking of Illegal Goods: The Drug Trade 
Since about 2005 UNODC noticed a strong increase in 
the number of seizures of cocaine on route to Europe 
via West Africa.112 With a rising market in Europe, a 
decline in demand in the United States, and a better 
controlled Caribbean route, South American cocaine 
traffickers started to make extensive use of West Afri-
can countries as transit zones.113 Contrary to neigh-
boring Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone were not 
identified as important hubs in the trade at the time. 
However, in 2008 two events served as eye-openers to 
international as well as local officials concerning the 
vulnerabilities of the two countries. 
The Global Stress Factor: Cocaine Trafficking 
Both Liberia and Sierra Leone had been connected 
with the trafficking of cocaine and heroin before, 
notably in the 1980s, and the cultivation, trafficking, 
and consumption of cannabis are very common. But 
the discovery of about 700 kg of cocaine on a Cessna 
plane from Venezuela that had landed at Lungi Air-
port in Sierra Leone’s capital, Freetown, in 2008 still 
came as a shock. Apart from seven foreign nationals – 
three Colombians, two Mexicans, a Venezuelan, and 
an American – eleven Sierra Leoneans were arrested in 
the affair.114 Before, in July 2007, another plane had 
from Asia, namely China and Korea, are engaged in these activ-
ities off the coast of West Africa (LIB-24_25-11-13; LIB-31_27-11-13; 
SL-12_23-1-14; SL-17_24-1-14). 
112  UNODC, Drug Trafficking As a Security Threat in West Africa 
(Vienna: UNODC, November 2008), 3. 
113  Numbers have to be taken with a pinch of salt, but for 2010 
UNODC estimated that 10 percent of European seizures – meaning 
18 tons of pure cocaine worth about $1.25 billion – might have 
passed through West Africa, see UNODC, Transnational Organized 
Crime in West Africa: A Threat Assessment (Vienna: UNODC, February 
2013), 17. 
114  Lansana Gberie, State Officials and Their Involvement in Drug 
Trafficking in West Africa: Preliminary Findings, West Africa Com-
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been intercepted in Venezuela with 2.5 tons of cocaine 
destined for Sierra Leone.115 
This time, the seizure was on Sierra Leonean soil, 
and the system proved quite unprepared to deal with 
it. First, no adequate legal basis existed, so a retroac-
tive new law had to be passed in 2008. In the end, 16 
of the 18 arrested were found guilty,116 which so far 
represents the only convictions in a higher-end cocaine 
case in Sierra Leone.117 Second, apart from weak regu-
lation, state officials had apparently been implicated. 
Among the convicted was Ahmed Sesay, national foot-
ball team manager and the cousin of the Minister of 
Transport and Aviation; he was fined 300 million 
Leones and sentenced to five years of imprisonment. 
Even though evidence emerged in the trial that the 
minister himself had knowledge of the incoming 
plane and gave permission for its landing, he was ap-
pointed again to high-ranking official positions after 
an initial suspension by the president.118 
Liberia was directly confronted with cocaine being 
trafficked through the region the same year. The French 
Navy caught the ship “Blue Atlantic” 100 miles off-
shore loaded with 2.5 tons of cocaine in 92 barrels 
with a value of about $500 million. Even though the 
vessel was apparently not destined for Liberia, it was 
brought to Monrovia, where the Ghanaian crew was 
arrested.119 The case revealed the shortfalls of the 
criminal justice system in Liberia, where possession 
and trafficking of drugs is tried under a public health 
act with insignificant fines.120 A special drug law 
making drug trafficking a non-bailable offense was 
drafted, but has not yet entered into force.121 Even 
under the very weak legal basis, the “Blue Atlantic” 
case was finally dropped, as the Supreme Court denied 
to confirm the convictions of the crew, as the arrest-
ing French officer was not present as a witness.122 
mission on Drugs (WACD) Background Paper no. 5 (Kofi Annan 
Foundation, 2013), 14. 
115  UNODC, Cocaine Trafficking in West Africa: The Threat to Stability 
and Development (with Special Reference to Guinea-Bissau), (Vienna: 
UNODC, December 2007), 19. 
116  Walker and Burchert, “A Desk Study of Sierra Leone”  
(see note 103), 175. 
117  Status in February 2014: Interview SL-45_7-2-14. 
118  Gberie, State Officials (see note 114), 14–15. 
119  Interviews LIB-3_13-11-2013; LIB-51_5-12-13. 
120  UN Panel of Experts, Midterm report, May 2014  
(see note 57), 21. 
121  “Liberia: Call for Tougher Drug Laws,” IRIN News, Monrovia, 
December 7, 2012. 
122  Interview LIB-26_26-11-13. 
Another high-level incident demonstrated that 
Liberia itself was at risk of becoming a transit zone 
for South American cocaine as well. When a Sierra 
Leonean drug kingpin called Gibrilla Kamara and 
seven others were arrested in Liberia through a sting 
operation of the US Drug Enforcement Administration 
(DEA) and Liberian agents in 2010 and transferred to 
the United States, the trial revealed that “the defend-
ants attempted to bribe high-level officials in the 
Liberian Government in order to protect shipments of 
vast quantities of cocaine, and to use Liberia as a trans-
shipment point for further distribution of the cocaine 
in Africa and Europe.”123 This case is enlightening in 
several respects. First, larger drug seizures in West 
Africa have usually involved Western security or law 
enforcement agencies, as in this case with the US DEA. 
Second, while the head and deputy head of the Liberian 
National Security Agency, who had been approached by 
the network, cooperated with US authorities, leading 
to the joint operation, it is quite likely that traffickers 
have been more successful in securing complicity in 
other circumstances. In fact, the US Department of 
State concluded in 2011 that trafficking rings were 
increasingly active in Sierra Leone, “often relying on 
corrupted government officials, police and intelli-
gence officers, who have accepted bribes to turn a 
blind eye to the traffickers’ illegal activities.”124 Third, 
the operating networks comprised people inside and 
outside the region – in this case “a Russian pilot, a 
Nigerian narcotics broker, a Colombian cocaine sup-
plier and a Ghanaian maritime expert.”125 This seems 
to be indicative of the modes of operation at the time. 
More recently, West African traffickers are not merely 
providing logistical services anymore, but play an in-
creasingly independent role in bringing cocaine into 
the region.126 
The events in 2008 in Liberia and Sierra Leone mark 
a period of large and frequent cocaine seizure in West 
Africa before total quantities discovered began decreas-
ing. Very likely, this is not simply due to a decline in 
123  United States Attorney Southern District of New York, 
“Sierra Leone Man Pleads Guilty in Manhattan Federal Court to 
International Narcotics Distribution Conspiracy,” Sierra Herald, 
March 1, 2011, http://www.sierraherald.com/cocaine-us-trial-
sesay.htm (accessed August 22, 2014). 
124  United States Department of State, International Narcotics 
Control Strategy Report. Drug and Chemical Control, Report, Vol. I 
(March 2011), 480. 
125  Gberie, State Officials (see note 114), 22. 
126  UNODC, Transnational Organized Crime in West Africa (see note 
113), 4. 
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drugs trafficked, but to a change in operations. In 
any case, such a change seems to have taken place 
after the Lungi affair in Sierra Leone. Apparently, 
some Nigerians engaged in the trade there had to 
move underground, and there were no major cases 
at the airport following the Cessna incident.127 The 
number of mules on international flights also seems 
to have been reduced. But a common assumption is 
that cocaine trafficking through Sierra Leone con-
tinues through the use of containerized cargo. Vessels 
coming from South America might bring in hard 
drugs through Freetown port or load their cargo onto 
smaller boats off the coast before being sent by car 
to Guinea or on boats to Europe.128 In line with this 
trend, a container coming from Ecuador belonging 
to a Nigerian-run business was intercepted at the port 
of Freetown in 2011. Apparently, cocaine had been 
hidden in the regular cargo containing baby diapers,129 
but it was gone when the container was opened.130 
Despite some improvements in the capacities and 
management of the port at Freetown, the general 
assessment is that it remains highly vulnerable for 
trafficking of all kinds, since scanner operations are 
not consistent in the container area and basically non-
existent in the general cargo area.131 Moreover, the 
coastline remains almost unmonitored.132 
The seaport in Liberia’s capital, Monrovia, is even 
more vulnerable to drug trafficking. There is very little 
control since the Freeport of Monrovia maintains its 
own police force and seems to object to deployments 
by the Liberian DEA.133 Frequent seizures at Roberts 
International Airport in 2013 and 2014, including of 
127  Interviews SL-11_21-1-14; SL-5_17-1-14. 
128  Interviews SL-6_17-1-14; SL-5_17-1-14; SL-13_23-1-14;  
SL-1_15-1-14. 
129  “Sierra Leone Seizes Drugs from Ecuador in Nappies,” 
BBC News, December 22, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-
africa-16300086 (accessed August 22, 2014). 
130  There is divergent information on the exact evidence. Most 
respondents stated that there only was an empty space in the 
container when it was opened and the seal had been removed 
or replaced (Interviews SL-12_23-1-14; SL-5_17-1-14; SL-1_15-1-14; 
SL-13_23-1-14). 
131  Interviews SL-29_30-1-14; SL-15_24-1-14; SL-12_23-1-14. 
132  Illegal fishing is another prevalent illicit activity in West 
Africa. Cases off the Sierra Leonean coast have, for example, 
been revealed by an Al Jazeera investigation, see “Pirate Fishing. 
People & Power Takes to the Seas off Sierra Leone to Investigate 
the Multi-million Dollar Illegal Fishing Trade,” Al Jazeera, Feb-
ruary 2, 2012: http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/ 
peopleandpower/2012/01/201212554311540797.html (accessed 
August 22, 2014). 
133  UN Panel of Experts, Midterm report, May 2014 (see note 57), 21. 
heroin, indicate that it remains an important entry 
into Liberia as well.134 For example, a Nigerian who 
had been tracked for a month was intercepted in No-
vember 2013 with 50 tubes of cocaine at the airport by 
the Liberian DEA.135 Another important case occurred 
there in February 2014, leading to the arrest of a resi-
dent of Brazil carrying 47 tubes of cocaine valued at 
$352,000.136 However, mules might also be using the 
smaller Spriggs Payne Airport in Monrovia, which 
links Liberia with South America via regional flights 
and lacks any real systematic control.137 Cocaine has 
also been found at Liberia’s borders with Guinea and 
Côte d’Ivoire.138 Apparently, former combatants and 
serving personnel of the military and police forces of 
the region are involved as couriers in the trafficking 
of cocaine, heroin, and marihuana to and through 
Liberia.139 There also are indications of corruption 
facilitating the drug trade at the airport.140 In Decem-
ber 2013, security officials who had just been deployed 
there arrested two national police officers and an 
officer of the Bureau of Immigration and Naturali-
zation when they tried to facilitate the entry of a 
smuggler with 3.5 kg of heroin.141 
Naturally, identifying trends in the drug trade based 
on seizures has its limitations. For example, it is dif-
ficult to say whether the mentioned cases indicate 
changes in the activities of smugglers or changes in 
the effectiveness of law enforcement. In both coun-
tries, TCUs142 were established in 2010 and 2011, 
respectively, as part of the West Africa Coast Initiative 
run by UNODC, Interpol, and the United Nations Office 
for West Africa (UNOWA). These units have engaged in 
intelligence gathering and various operations to com-
bat different kinds of transnational crime, some of 
it linked to – or part of – the drug trade. Most of the 
mentioned seizures and arrests came about through 
the work of these units and/or increased international 
efforts to fight the drug trade in West Africa. 
Despite the difficulty in identifying trends, some 
aspects are quite clearly illustrated by those cases. 
Liberia and Sierra Leone remain very vulnerable to 
134  Interview LIB-11_19-11-13. 
135  Interview LIB-10_19-11-13. 
136  UN Panel of Experts, Midterm report, May 2014 (see note 57), 20. 
137  Interviews LIB-14_20-11-13; LIB-11_19-11-13. 
138  Interview LIB-10_19-11-13. 
139  UN Panel of Experts, Midterm report, May 2014 (see note 57), 20. 
140  Interview LIB-3_13-11-2013. 
141  UN Panel of Experts, Midterm report, May 2014 (see note 57), 21. 
142  In Sierra Leone, the unit is called “Transnational Organized 
Crime Unit” (TOCU). 
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operations by international drug traffickers. Apart 
from the relatively easy entry, if people are caught, 
challenges remain in prosecuting them. Apart from 
the weak legal foundation in Liberia, convictions 
for trafficking are also rare in Sierra Leone. In both 
countries, it is very easy to be released after an arrest 
without due process by paying a “fine” or a bribe. In 
Liberia, the police and the courts have been rated as 
the most corrupt institutions in the country, indicat-
ing the common perception “that wealth, not guilt, 
determines the outcome of a case.”143 The situation 
might be slightly, but not fundamentally, better in 
Sierra Leone, particularly for drug cases where large 
profits are involved.144 Furthermore, for a long time 
there was no feeling of urgency, as the transit of 
cocaine and heroin was not seen to be particularly 
dangerous for West Africa. Indeed, there is little doubt 
that hard drugs are still mainly passing through Sierra 
Leone and Liberia as well as other countries of the 
region. But the recently published report of the West 
Africa Commission on Drugs (WACD) has pointed out 
the severe negative consequences of the drug trade for 
West Africa, among others an increase in drug con-
sumption.145 
Planting, Trading, Using: 
The Regional Cannabis Market 
Beyond these newer developments driven by shifts in 
international markets, there is a relevant local and 
regional drug market in cannabis. In fact, both Sierra 
Leone and Liberia are production, transit, and desti-
nation countries. Initially, cannabis was introduced to 
West Africa in the 20th century and spread particular-
ly by Sierra Leonean traders along the coast in the 
1920s and 1930s.146 During wartime, marihuana 
became entangled with the war economies, and com-
batants in both Liberia and Sierra Leone were heavy 
consumers. 
In Liberia, the center of cultivation is in Bong, 
Nimba, and Lofa counties; in Sierra Leone it seems 
to be in the north and western areas, even close to 
143  Human Rights Watch, “No Money, No Justice”: Police Corruption 
and Abuse in Liberia (August 2013), 21. 
144  Interview SL-45_7-2-14. 
145  West Africa Commission on Drugs, Not Just in Transit: Drugs, 
the State and Society in West Africa, An Independent Report of the 
West Africa Commission on Drugs (June 2014), 9. 
146  Neil Carrier and Gernot Klantschnig, Africa and the War on 
Drugs (London and New York: Zed Books, 2012), 35. 
Freetown.147 But growing cannabis is not limited to 
these zones, particularly as it brings high returns 
in comparison to crops such as rice, and it is an im-
portant source of income in areas with few opportu-
nities.148 Occasionally, plantations are discovered and 
destroyed by law enforcement, for example in lower 
Montserrado county in Liberia149 or in the Kambia 
District north of Freetown in Sierra Leone in 2012, 
where the police were attacked by youths who tried 
to protect the site.150 However, destroyed plantations 
usually represent a fraction of what is planted in the 
same area. There are also frequent allegations of pro-
tection of the cultivation by politicians, chiefs, or the 
police.151 
The trafficking of cannabis links the whole region. 
What is planted in Liberia and Sierra Leone partly goes 
to Guinea or Côte d’Ivoire, but trade seems to be par-
ticularly active between the two countries. Drugs 
are transported from Liberia to Sierra Leone and vice-
versa,152 and consumption in both countries is signify-
cant. In the process of trafficking, security officers are 
clearly involved, not just as distant protectors, but in 
transporting the drugs themselves.153 Often official 
vehicles are used, as in the case of a Liberian police 
officer who was arrested in November 2013 at Bo 
border crossing in a joint operation of the national 
police, the Liberian DEA, and the TCU. The car car-
rying cannabis with a street value of more than 
$36,000 was marked as being part of the presidential 
escort and had been observed repeatedly crossing the 
border unchecked. The operation led to the arrests of 
a superintendent, the head of the presidential escort, 
and four others, including a member of the Sierra 
Leonean armed forces.154 In January 2014 another 
officer from the Police Support Unit who transported 
145 kg of cannabis valued at $11,500 in his vehicle 
was caught.155 
147  Interviews LIB-3_13-11-2013; LIB-24_25-11-13; SL-1_15-1-14; 
SL-17_24-1-14; SL-13_23-1-14. 
148  Walker and Burchert, “A Desk Study of Sierra Leone” (see 
note 103), 176; Interview LIB-38_2-12-13. 
149  Interview LIB-20_22-11-13. 
150  Walker and Burchert, “A Desk Study of Sierra Leone” 
(see note 103), 176 
151  Interviews LIB-24_25-11-13; SL-47_8-2-14; SL-6_17-1-14; 
SL-17_24-1-14. 
152  Interviews LIB-20_22-11-13; SL-4_17-1-14; SL-6_17-1-14; 
SL-13_23-1-14; LIB-10_19-11-13. 
153  Interview LIB-38_2-12-13. 
154  UN Panel of Experts, Midterm report, May 2014 (see note 57), 
21; Interviews LIB-11_19-11-13; LIB-51_5-12-13; LIB-6_15-11-2013. 
155  UN Panel of Experts, Midterm report, May 2014 (see note 57), 21. 
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How Is Crime Organized? 
There is no clear indication of systematic links 
between the trade in cannabis and the trafficking of 
cocaine or heroin, unless it is at the level of smaller 
couriers or through the exchange of smaller quanti-
ties. It is well established that facilitators of cocaine 
smuggling are often paid in substance, which at least 
partly remains in the transit countries.156 Even though 
there are no reliable numbers for consumption in 
Liberia and Sierra Leone, there are indications that 
cocaine and heroin are used beyond the very small 
upper class of wealthy, who can easily afford pure 
hard drugs. Cocaine seems to be quite easily available 
in the streets, mostly in very small quantities, for 
example as “magic sticks” or as crack. Furthermore, 
there are other mixed substances labeled as “brown-
brown” or “Italian White.”157 These substances as well 
as more significant quantities of cannabis are said to 
be consumed by young people in the “ghettos,”158 par-
ticularly among the “boys” in mining areas.159 Theft 
and robberies related to drug abuse are reported,160 
and quite a few members of vigilante groups or those 
involved in mob violence are drug users, even though 
the link to aggression is far from straightforward, 
particularly for cannabis. In any case, the problem of 
drug consumption seems to be growing rather than 
disappearing. This might partly be a result of having 
very few initiatives to tackle the issue following the 
massive abuse of drugs by combatants during the civil 
wars. But it also seems to be an indication of a slightly 
rising supply of hard drugs to the region in general. 
How Is Crime Organized? 
Liberia and Sierra Leone might be largely negligible 
as markets for illegal goods or trafficked legal goods 
on a global scale. But from a regional and country per-
156  Both Liberia and Sierra Leone are also markets for counter-
feit medicine, usually produced in Asia and entering the coun-
tries from Guinea (Interviews LIB-51_5-12-13; SL-2_16-1-14; 
LIB-6_15-11-2013; LIB-20_22-11-13). 
157  Interviews SL-5_17-1-14; SL-43_6-2-14; SL-13_23-1-14; 
LIB-3_13-11-2013; LIB-10_19-11-13; LIB-34_28-11-13; LIB-40_2-12-
13. The exact meaning of these terms is difficult to establish, 
but most often they are used for mixtures including cocaine. All 
types of medical drugs such as Diazepam are used as well and, of 
course, strong locally produced alcohol (Interviews SL-43_6-2-14; 
LIB-34_28-11-13). 
158  The term “ghetto” refers to a place where drugs are sold and 
consumed, not to a neighborhood. 
159  Interviews LIB-3_13-11-2013; LIB-37_2-12-13; LIB-24_25-11-13. 
160  Interviews LIB-48_4-12-13; LIB-40_2-12-13. 
spective, their illicit economies are highly relevant. In 
addition, the activities around natural resources and 
drugs outlined in the previous section have important 
repercussions beyond West Africa. However, not all 
aspects and practices of illicit economies outlined in 
the previous section qualify as organized crime. Sure-
ly, the artisanal gold digger without a license or an 
individual market-woman smuggling small portions 
of cannabis are not the primary concern. Organized 
crime is marked by the “continuity, structure and 
criminality for financial or material gain.”161 But there 
is a general trend that organized crime is pursued by 
increasingly flexible and heterogeneous networks.162 
Taking this and the relatively broad definition intro-
duced earlier163 into account, core components of the 
activities mentioned can actually be categorized as 
organized crime. However, there are important dif-
ferences in how these crimes are organized. 
Flows, Producers, and Traders 
Surely, commodities of a very different nature travel 
along the same routes, and the same network might 
switch from smuggling one good to another if it is 
more profitable. But looking at the universe of illicit 
activities in Liberia and Sierra Leone, some important 
differences are visible due, among other things, to the 
goods involved and the international markets for them. 
Naturally, for legal goods such as gold, diamonds, and 
timber, the line between licit and illicit is much less 
161  Joseph Wheatley, “Transnational Organized Crime: A Survey 
of Laws, Policies and International Conventions,” in Routledge 
Handbook of Transnational Organized Crime, ed. Felia Allum and Stan 
Gilmour (Abingdon and New York, 2012), 65–79 (67). 
162  See, for example, the following assessment: Europol, SOCTA 
2013, Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment-Public Version 
(Den Haag: Europol, March 2013), 8. 
163  This is largely in line with the Palermo Convention refer-
ring to an organized criminal group as “a structured group of 
three or more persons, existing for a period of time and acting in 
concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes 
or offences established in accordance with this Convention, in 
order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material 
benefit,” see Article 2 (a), United Nations Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime, in: United Nations Convention 
against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols thereto (New 
York: United Nations, 2004), 5. Liberia and Sierra Leone are both 
parties to the Convention and its Protocols. However, some 
details of the Convention’s definition are difficult to apply in the 
context of fragile states, namely the reference to “serious crimes 
and offenses” in a context where the legal basis might be weak 
or non-existent. 
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clear-cut, particularly if laws and regulating institu-
tions undergo constant change, as in post-war Liberia 
and Sierra Leone. For example, licensed as well as 
unlicensed dealers are involved in the illicit trade of 
diamonds, and often non-licensed miners or dealers 
seek to legalize their possession by selling to a license-
holder. Generally, most activities in gold- and diamond 
mining and trade rely on established relationships 
and informal rules.164 In fact, foreign investors who 
cannot rely on rule-of-law principles enforced by the 
state nor on such long-standing personalized networks 
frequently become victims of fraud. The advance-fee 
fraud with minerals clearly falls into the illegal sphere. 
The criminal groups involved are quite sophisticated, 
since they set up the fraud using the internet and 
need the financial means to set up offices for duping 
investors.165 Apart from that, however, the illicit and 
licit markets in gold and diamonds in Sierra Leone 
and Liberia are basically organized along the same 
lines, or at least deeply entrenched. Not surprisingly, 
the continuity with the time of war economies is quite 
high in terms of actors and practices. But with the 
new legal and institutional framework, particularly 
for diamonds, changes have occurred, most notably 
in who can provide local protection. 
The organization of illegal logging is different in 
so far as timber requires another level of logistics. 
Furthermore, demand has shifted significantly – from 
Europe during the time of war economies to Asia. 
Larger companies need to establish links with local 
transport businesses as well as secure access to ports 
for shipping their containers. But as with gold and 
diamonds, timber is often “legalized” at some point in 
the trade chain. In fact, the PUP saga in Liberia shows 
how foreign companies acquire licenses using fraudu-
lent means or use legal loopholes for their operations. 
Dubious arrangements between international busi-
nesses and the central state have been common since 
pre-war times. Thus, in both Liberia and Sierra Leone, 
citizens are often suspicious of larger operations 
today. Frequent conflicts occur with regard to land 
rights, for example when people have traditionally 
used land that is then assigned to a foreign company 
for exploitation without involvement of the commu-
nity. Much debate is also steered by the often intrans-
parent way concessions are negotiated and “corporate 
164  Interview SL-30_30-1-14; Engwicht, Illegal Markets 
(see note 66), 17. 
165  Interview SL-27_29-1-14. 
social responsibility” projects are implemented in the 
area where a company is operating.166 
Similar to the gold and diamond business, the line 
between licit and illicit activities in logging is par-
ticularly blurred and also moving due to changing 
regulations and export bans. Furthermore, China and 
India are now the largest importers of timber. At the 
same time, the United States, the EU, and Australia 
have raised barriers for the import of illegal timber 
and products made from illegal timber through new 
laws.167 Beyond an increasing role for Asian financiers 
and companies, the operations in illegal logging might 
have remained at the level of middlemen, as during 
the wars. But long-term networks of mutual trust are 
also less important in logging, as cheating in the actual 
business is not as easy as with gold and diamonds. 
On the other hand, it needs a stronger facilitation net-
work for the trafficking because transport by trucks 
and ships is essential. 
Finally, the trade in drugs as an illegal good has its 
own organizational elements. Surely, cultivation and 
trafficking of cannabis is mostly locally driven in 
Liberia and Sierra Leone but with a regional reach in 
markets. It is probably the least organized segment 
of the illicit economies analyzed here. The act of 
smuggling cannabis across borders, even in larger 
quantities, seems to be often pursued by individuals, 
including increasing numbers of women. However, 
there is also more organized trade in cannabis using 
transnational networks, which tend to involve secu-
rity agents. In fact, a frequent allegation in Liberia and 
Sierra Leone is that the police in particular are engaged 
in transporting and/or trading cannabis. Moreover, 
plantations can be vast and involve a network of people, 
as two operations of the TOCU in Sierra Leone demon-
strated when cannabis sativa worth $11,000 was seized 
and several persons were arrested in the Port Loko Dis-
trict.168 There are also frequent reports of young men 
guarding and defending cultivation areas. 
However, the profits and the degree of organization 
are nowhere near those in cocaine trafficking through 
Liberia and Sierra Leone. The two countries have not 
yet been rated as major hubs, but displacement effects 
from neighboring Guinea or Guinea-Bissau are possible, 
as both have been undergoing political transitions. 
166  This is not specific for the logging sector, but often occurs 
in relation to mining licenses of larger companies in Liberia and 
Sierra Leone as well. 
167  “Logging Company Flouts Liberian President’s Timber 
Export Ban” (see note 101), 2. 
168  SL-21_27-1-14. 
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How Is Crime Organized? 
The general trend for West Africa is that it has moved 
from being an area of transit into a place of transaction, 
giving more influence to local participants in the mar-
ket.169 Thus, the networks have become more grounded 
in the region. In Liberia and Sierra Leone, there surely 
are upfront businesses, people involved in logistics 
such as transport of drugs and also in the small retail 
market. As the private sector in both countries is tra-
ditionally dominated by people of Lebanese origin, 
some very likely play a role in these activities,170 but 
clearly so do Liberians and Sierra Leoneans. The com-
mon assumption is that Nigerians mostly run the 
trafficking, also using façade businesses and Nigerian 
bank branches at times.171 But it is possible that 
Colombians and Brazilians are still driving operations 
in Sierra Leone.172 Obviously, such generalizations 
should be treated with caution, but they are in line 
with what has been revealed through exposed traf-
ficking cases. In contrast to the cannabis trade, there 
apparently is no systematic connection between traf-
ficking operations in Sierra Leone and Liberia. 
Protection and Facilitation 
In general, “commodity traders” and “protection rack-
eteers” are the two basic types of criminal syndicates. 
The latter are usually confined to a single state’s 
borders but frequently take control of the local retail 
market for drugs or other goods.173 In Liberia and 
Sierra Leone, this role was taken on by armed groups 
during the civil wars. These groups, among other 
things, made profits by demanding money, material, 
or transport from businesses in areas under their 
control. In the post-war transitions, state authority 
was at least formally reestablished. But since hybrid 
forms of governance emerged, protection in Liberia 
and Sierra Leone has depended on access to patronage 
networks – preferably those that are core parts of the 
state-building process. Such personalized systems 
169  Mark Shaw, Leadership Required: Drug Trafficking and the Crisis 
of Statehood in West Africa, ISS Policy Brief no. 37 (Pretoria: Insti-
tute for Security Studies, October 2012), 3. 
170  Interview SL-35_3-2-14. 
171  Interviews LIB-23_25-11-13; LIB-20_22-11-13; LIB-31_27-11-13; 
LIB-46_3-12-13; SL-12_23-1-14; Nigerians are also said to dominate 
organized armed robbery operations in Monrovia (Interview 
LIB-35_30-11-13). 
172  Interview SL-5_17-1-14. 
173  Misha Glenny, McMafia: Seriously Organised Crime (London: 
Vintage Books, 2009), 205. 
provide easy entry points for organized crime. There-
fore, it is hardly surprising that criminal actors in 
Liberia and Sierra Leone largely rely on securing pro-
tection from state actors today. In fact, when asking 
whether crime tends to be organized, respondents 
in Liberia and Sierra Leone frequently refer to the 
involvement of politicians or security agents as in-
dicators of the level of organization.174 
Again the setup differs depending on product and 
market, but within the different sectors it seems to be 
quite similar for both countries. Generally, three basic 
setups exist. In the first, officials facilitate illicit activ-
ities with certificates or licenses, for example to engage 
in mining or the export of natural resources. Natural-
ly, this only works for legal goods. The second option 
is the classic “paying somebody off” for protection. 
Either criminal actors arrange a cover-up in advance 
or they engage in negotiations with officials when 
caught. But the line between the two is not clear-cut 
and the two can be combined, for example when a 
general facilitator interferes ad hoc with the work of 
law enforcement agencies. The latter happened in 
Liberia with the deputy director of the Liberian DEA, 
Albert Chelley, who was dismissed in August 2013 
because he had conspired with Nigerian drug traf-
fickers and on two occasions prevented the arrest 
of heroin smugglers.175 In Sierra Leone, it has been 
reported that there is also interference by paramount 
chiefs and politicians on behalf of people in cannabis 
cultivation.176 Despite reforms of the legal and insti-
tutional frameworks, many transactions still depend 
on personal relations – for legal and illegal businesses 
alike. These are not easy to circumvent, as one official 
in a Liberian border town stressed: “People buy their 
way out, it is fishy. People are reluctant to enforce the 
law. When you take it to the bosses, there is another 
bargain up there. And it is a matter of social relation-
ship, you compromise.”177 Ultimately, the fear of fal-
ling out with the patronage system keeps it together. 
In the third scheme, officials are actually commod-
ity traders themselves, or illicit traders gain public 
office (“state capture”). For example, it is said that gov-
ernment officials are behind “cartels” in Freetown – 
places where the more expensive drugs are sold178 or 
174  Interviews SL-45_7-2-14; SL-31_30-1-14; LIB-11_19-11-13; 
LIB-19_22-11-13. 
175  Gberie, State Officials (see note 114), 22. 
176  Interview SL-1_15-1-14. 
177  Interview LIB-50_5-12-13. 
178  Interview SL-43_6-2-14. 
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Illicit Economies and Organized Crime in Liberia and Sierra Leone 
where politicians engage in illicit mining operations.179 
The majority of cases of state complicity, however, 
seem to be in the first two categories. It is difficult to 
define if such networks of protection – or parts of 
them – stem from the time of the war economies. But 
as representatives of former armed groups have often 
been integrated into the state-building process and/or 
have set up their own businesses after the conflict, 
some continuity is very likely with regard to illicit 
activities around natural resources, and possibly the 
cannabis trade. 
Contrary to parts of Latin America, there is little 
violence in the organized segments of illicit econo-
mies in Liberia and Sierra Leone. When the extent 
of cocaine trafficking through West Africa became 
visible, there was the fear that the trade could “turn 
the region into an epicentre of lawlessness and 
instability.”180 Other transit areas such as Central 
America’s Northern Triangle have indeed experienced 
high levels of criminal violence. In Guatemala and 
El Salvador, for example, murder rates have even ex-
ceeded those that occurred during the civil wars.181 
This level of instability has not (yet) materialized in 
Liberia or Sierra Leone, most likely because criminal 
networks can secure their operations and profits by 
other means. Currently, there do not seem to be any 
links between organized crime and armed or terrorist 
groups that could challenge state authority.182 
Yet, pockets of violence exist and can become quite 
intense at times. Apart from mob violence – often 
related to petty crime – there are violent armed rob-
beries and land-related conflicts.183 There also have 
been protests and riots against industrial mining com-
panies – such as Octea and London Mining in Sierra 
Leone184 and China Union in Liberia185 – that turned 
179  Interview SL-45_7-2-14. 
180  Antonio Maria Costa, Executive Director, UNODC, in 
UNODC, Drug Trafficking As a Security Threat in West Africa (see 
note 112), 1. 
181  Liza Ten Velde, The Northern Triangle’s Drugs-violence Nexus: 
The Role of the Drugs Trade in Criminal Violence and Policy Responses in 
Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras, TNI Briefing Series no. 2012/1, 
Drugs & Conflict Debate Papers (Amsterdam: Transnational 
Institute, November 2012), 2. 
182  A connection of the diamond trade in Sierra Leone to 
Hezbollah and allegedly al-Qaeda has been detected in the past. 
Taking the central role of Lebanese businesspeople in the Li-
berian and Sierra Leonean economies into account, the flow of 
some money into the coffers of Hezbollah is probably still hap-
pening, but most likely not at a significant level. 
183  Small Arms Survey, Reading between the Lines: Crime and Vic-
timization in Liberia, Issue Brief No. 2, September 2011, p. 1. 
184  Interview SL-47_8-2-14. 
violent. The violence has usually been related to accu-
sations that companies extract resources without 
there being enough opportunities generated for com-
munities. Occasional clashes have occurred in Sierra 
Leone when marihuana plantations have been raided 
by law enforcement.186 Furthermore, there has been 
small-scale violence allegedly linked to illicit gold min-
ing in the Gola Forest region bordering Sierra Leone 
and Liberia. The former combatants in this area, who 
are also involved in the trafficking of drugs and arti-
sanal shotguns, are described as individuals who “live 
in semi-organized autonomous groups outside of any 
state authority, often under the direct influence of for-
mer ‘generals’ who commanded rebel factions during 
the Liberian civil conflict.”187 The influx of such arti-
sanal guns, produced mostly in Guinea, is a general 
concern in Liberia and Sierra Leone.188 In addition, 
there are still arms caches from the different wars that 
are occasionally discovered.189 Whether this potential 
for violence will link more closely with organized 
crime remains to be seen. But there clearly are dif-




185  Interview LIB-37_2-12-13. 
186  Interview SL-17_24-1-14. 
187  UN Panel of Experts, Final report, November 25, 2013 
(see note 60), 12; UN Panel of Experts, Midterm report, May 
2014 (see note 57), 18. 
188  Interviews LIB-3_13-11-2013; SL-11_21-1-14. 
189  Interview LIB-20_22-11-13. 
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 Conclusion: Threats and Possible Responses 
 
The vulnerability of fragile states to organized crime 
is commonly explained by porous borders and a lack 
of regulation and effective law enforcement. All of 
these aspects are also cited by agencies in Liberia and 
Sierra Leone, which usually refer to weak capacities 
and insufficient resources as being the main challeng-
es in fighting organized crime. These deficiencies are 
real, but they mask an ultimate dilemma in tackling 
organized crime in cases such as Liberia and Sierra 
Leone: criminal activities are often tied to the very 
state that is supposed to build and defend the (re-
formed) framework of legality. As demonstrated in 
the previous section, illicit economies are not simply 
an expression of areas beyond state control or “un-
governed spaces.” Although one aspect of weak state 
authority concerns remote regions that have rarely 
seen the presence of state agents (or where state 
agents are pushed out by competing authorities), the 
more common theme in illicit economies in Liberia 
and Sierra Leone today is the involvement of such 
state actors. This phenomenon occurs all over the 
world, but it has been identified as a main challenge 
linked to organized crime in West Africa. 
In Liberia and Sierra Leone, this challenge has been 
exacerbated by the inclusion of existing networks and 
practices into politics and the economies of both coun-
tries since the civil wars. It is a well-known dilemma 
in post-conflict situations that organized crime figures 
are powerful actors, and thus, “[i]gnoring or excluding 
them can threaten political stability. Including them 
undermines reform plans.”190 Indeed, disrupting any 
form of organized crime can have severe negative con-
sequences in its own right. As the organization of 
criminal actors is still highly fragmented in Liberia 
and Sierra Leone, the danger is in erasing the less co-
herent, smaller groups and triggering the reorganiza-
tion of stronger networks, which might ultimately 
increase competition and the likelihood of violence. 
Thus, a selective approach focusing on the most dam-
aging practices and criminal networks might be 
promising.191 
190  William Reno, “Understanding Criminality in West African 
Conflicts,” International Peacekeeping 16, no. 1 (2009): 47–61 (55). 
191  Ibid.: 49. 
International actors have mostly pursued the 
approach of building up law enforcement in general 
when cocaine trafficking through West Africa emerged 
as an increasing threat. Apart from the mentioned 
West Africa Coast Initiative of UNODC, Interpol, and 
UNOWA, the EU has set up the Cocaine Route Pro-
gram. It comprises several projects in West Africa, for 
example the Seaport Cooperation Programme, which 
aims at better cooperation in the fight against mari-
time trafficking and capacity-building in the fight 
against international criminal networks, which in-
cludes Sierra Leone as a target country.192 A whole set 
of bilateral efforts are being undertaken as well, par-
ticularly by the United States, France, and the United 
Kingdom.193 In Liberia and Sierra Leone, the UN mis-
sions’ mandates have also been adapted over time to 
include the fight against organized crime and drug 
trafficking.194 However, the UN Integrated Peace-
building Office in Sierra Leone was closed earlier in 
2014, and the UN Mission in Liberia started its draw-
down in 2012 by reducing primarily its military 
strength, with the third phase ending in July 2015.195 
Even though the UN presence remains quite strong 
in both countries, there is the fear that the withdraw-
als will leave a gap in the security architecture. There-
fore, the setup of functioning local institutions has 
become a major concern. Since existing bodies in 
Liberia and Sierra Leone have often been dysfunctional 
in fulfilling their assigned mandates, new institutions 
such as the Transnational Crime Units and Anti-Cor-
192  For details see the website of the EU Cocaine Route Pro-
gramme: http://corms.esteri.it/?id=16&log_user=0 (accessed 
August 22, 2014). 
193  For a comprehensive list of programs, see Camino Kavanagh 
and Summer Walker, International and Regional Responses to Drug 
Trafficking in West Africa: A Preliminary Overview, WACD Background 
Paper no. 6 (Kofi Annan Foundation, September 2013). 
194  The mandate of the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in 
Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL), established in 2008, explicitly refers to 
“efforts to counter transnational organized crime and drug traf-
ficking” (Final Report of the SG on UNIPSIL, March 2014, 1), where-
as UNMIL had been including measures for fighting the drug trade 
in the implementation of the existing mandate since about 2008, 
see Hansen, Mehr Interaktion als geplant (see note 49), 206. 
195  See UNMIL website: http://unmil.unmissions.org/Default. 
aspx?tabid=5361&language=en-US. 
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ruption Commissions have been set up. Even though 
some of these bodies have clearly contributed to iden-
tifying serious vulnerabilities, they have also run 
into several problems. First, new agencies add to the 
already confusing – and at times overcrowded – set 
of institutions engaged in fighting crime and corrup-
tion, which not only leads to conflicts of competence, 
but also allows criminal networks to choose the most 
convenient partner. Moreover, the political process 
remains highly vulnerable. On the one hand, official 
positions are one of the very few ways to make money 
fast in both countries, and on the other hand, finan-
cial resources are needed to actually get into such a 
position. Thus, money from illicit business continues 
to buy protection and political capital, for example 
by financing election campaigns. Finally, new institu-
tions still operate in a context where money can buy 
“justice.” Those with the highest criminal profits 
might be targeted and arrested, but they are also the 
ones most likely to walk free due to the (mal)function-
ing criminal justice system. So, various options re-
main for facilitating and protecting organized crime. 
It can be argued that as long as the most disruptive 
activities are contained, this might sustain the precari-
ous balance between reform and political stability in 
Liberia and Sierra Leone. Indeed, serious instability, 
such as that experienced in the transit zones of Latin 
America, has not occurred. On the one hand, the in-
complete state-building process and personalized 
power relationships provided a relatively easy operat-
ing environment for some criminal actors. On the 
other hand, the uncertainties due to political tran-
sitions and the strong international presence since 
the installation of UN missions might have prevented 
both countries from becoming major hubs of the inter-
national drug trade, despite existing vulnerabilities. 
However, there are potential sources of violence. 
The mix of patronage and corruption linked to illicit 
criminal activity has been proven to breed violence in 
Liberia and Sierra Leone in the 1990s.196 To put it dif-
ferently, criminal profits in politics could, like in Mali, 
ultimately lead to a scenario that “[creates] an impen-
etrable barrier to entry for legitimate democratic pro-
cesses.”197 Indeed, if political competition becomes 
increasingly reliant on criminal assets, this will re-
inforce the tendency of elites to rely on external rents. 
But such an evolution can also be a “game-changer” in 
196  Walker and Burchert, “A Desk Study of Sierra Leone” 
(see note 103), 164. 
197  Shaw, Leadership Required (see note 169), 2. 
existing power relations, since organized crime is not 
like any other source of (external) income. Increasing-
ly, politics can be held hostage to the interests of rela-
tively small networks. This might spur violent dis-
content among the population, particularly if profits 
do not trickle down and public services decline 
further. Moreover, criminal entrepreneurs might also 
link up to, or make use of, local groups with a high 
potential for violence, such as remnants of ex-combat-
ant groups still linked to their former commanders 
in remote mining areas or youth gangs in the capital 
cities. Both kinds of groups are already engaged in 
drug trafficking and, with rising consumption, might 
also become increasingly engaged in the distribution 
of hard drugs.198 Thus, leaving things as they are is 
also not an option. 
Some fear that the withdrawal of the UN missions 
could actually tip the balance in favor of organized 
crime. However, even with a reduced international 
presence, there are ways to support a selective response. 
Some points are particularly relevant in this regard. 
First, it is important to not (primarily) disrupt the 
lower echelons of organized crime, as depriving people 
of their illicit sources of income, for example artisanal 
mining or cannabis cultivation, might have negative 
repercussions and make the scenario of violent groups 
moving into other criminal activities more likely. In 
fact, officials in Liberia have frequently justified the 
tolerance of illicit activities in mining by pointing to 
the danger that former combatants might respond 
violently or end up seeking income through armed 
robbery instead.199 
Second, tailored responses can be effective in meet-
ing an urgent need to curb the most dangerous forms 
of organized crime. But ultimately, they can only be 
successful if the general system is functional. Thus, 
further long-term international engagement in the 
fields of rule of law and criminal justice is essential. 
Reforms in these fields are also crucial in order to 
ensure that exploitation of natural resources is under-
taken in a more transparent and accountable way. 
The main focus should be on the larger operations 
in logging and the industrial and small-scale sectors 
in gold and diamond mining. As tensions related to 
concessions – also for the exploitation of iron ore –  
198  Walker and Burchert, “A Desk Study of Sierra Leone” 
(see note 103), 170. 
199  UN Panel of Experts, Midterm report, May 2014 (see note 57), 
19; UN Panel of Experts, Final report, November 25, 2013 (see 
note 60), 19. 
SWP Berlin 
Organized Crime and State-building in  
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Community responses to drug abuse:  
Two stories from Liberia 
Liberians United Against Drug Abuse, 
Logan Town/Monrovia 
This local non-governmental organization was 
created in 1992 and engages in a broad set of activ-
ities – from the provision of education on drug 
abuse and school lectures to counseling, advocacy, 
and relapse prevention programs as well as the 
formation of community clubs. The small group 
of employees and volunteers is confronted with 
the negative effects of the abuse of all kinds of 
drugs, including heroin and cocaine, as well as 
locally produced alcohol. The most pressing con-
cerns are the disintegration of families, school 
dropouts, and drug-related prostitution and rob-
bery. As there is a general lack of social services 
and the organization receives very little support, 
it is struggling to keep its programs running. 
 
Collective Action Committee, Sergeant Kollie Town 
The 12 people on this community committee came 
together under the chairmanship of the local rev-
erend due to increasing problems with drug abuse 
and its consequences, including burglary, sexual 
abuse, and school dropouts. The committee’s 
response was to request that the national police 
establish a presence in the area. After the commu-
nity set up a temporary place for a depot them-
selves, the Quick Impact Project of UNMIL con-
structed a new police station. This has hardly curbed 
the problem, however, due to deficiencies in the 
functioning of the police force known from other 
places in Liberia. Thus, the committee that was 
setup as a volunteer service started to engage in 
the monitoring of the police itself, but is increas-
ingly struggling to keep up with its activities. 
 
have frequently led to violent demonstrations in 
Sierra Leone and Liberia, even requiring the interven-
tion of UNMIL,200 there is a clear need to find more 
effective ways of including local communities into the 
deal-making between companies and the central state. 
Third, incentives for the smuggling of gold and 
diamonds can (further) be removed through the 
harmonization of taxation and certification schemes. 
200  Twenty-seventh progress report of the Secretary-General on the United 
Nations Mission in Liberia (February 2014), 4. 
Many donors and non-governmental organizations are 
already active in this field, setting up a more account-
able and transparent system for mining and logging. 
But specific components of crime in these sectors – 
such as smuggling done by international investors 
through airports, as well as fraud schemes – need to 
be tackled by law enforcement approaches, as these 
are more organized, and potentially linked to other 
crimes such as money-laundering. 
Finally, in line with the report of the WACD pub-
lished in June 2014, a lot needs to be done in Liberia 
and Sierra Leone in order to decriminalize drug con-
sumption and low-level offenses and increase public 
health efforts for drug users. The current state of affairs 
in this regard is not very encouraging. In Liberia, the 
newly drafted law awaiting adoption is moving in the 
direction of draconian measures against all kinds of 
drug-related offenses.201 Furthermore, currently there 
is little help for drug users in both countries, either 
through treatment and counseling or harm-reduction. 
These are not merely health and social issues – they 
are also strongly related to state-building. The recent 
Ebola outbreak has not just underlined the poor state 
of the health systems in both countries, but it also 
highlights the low levels of trust by citizens in state 
institutions. In this context, a mere law enforcement 
response to drug abuse is even more problematic than 
elsewhere. So far, communities affected by problems 
related to drug abuse are mostly left to themselves, 
and those trying to find a response easily become over-
strained (see box for examples). 
Overall, what is needed is an approach to organized 
crime that combines the concerns of international and 
state security with human security. Cleary, the im-
pacts of organized crime on governance and the politi-
cal process need to be tackled. But state-building also 
needs to respond to issues of livelihood, health, and 
the environment linked to illicit economies. 
 
201  Camino Kavanagh, ed., Harmonizing Drug Legislation in West 
Africa – A Call for Minimum Standards, WACD Background paper 
no. 9 (Kofi Annan Foundation, 2014), 12. 
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DEA Drug Enforcement Agency 
ECOMOG ECOWAS Cease-Fire Monitoring Group 
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States 
EU European Union 
NPFL National Patriotic Front of Liberia 
PUP Private-use Permit 
RUF Revolutionary United Front (Sierra Leone) 
TCU Transnational Crime Unit 
TOCU Transnational Organized Crime Unit 
ULIMO United Liberation Movement of Liberia 
for Democracy 
UN United Nations 
UNIPSIL United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office 
in Sierra Leone 
UNMIL United Nations Mission in Liberia 
UNODC United Office on Drugs and Crime 
UNOWA United Nations Office for West Africa 
UNSC United Nations Security Council 
WACD West Africa Commission on Drugs 
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